This paper makes two straightforward points that we argue are central to understanding the literature and debate surrounding the stability of the Phillips curve. First, the endogeneity of monetary policy implies that aggregate data are largely uninformative as to the existence of a stable relationship between unemployment and future inflation. Second, if the NAIRU model is assumed to be true, regional data can be used to identify the structural relationship between unemployment and future inflation. We find that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a roughly 0.3 percentage point decline in inflation over the next year.
Introduction
This paper makes two straightforward points that we argue are central to understanding the literature that studies the stability of the Phillips curve. First, the endogeneity of monetary policy implies that aggregate data used in the analysis throughout this literature are largely uninformative as to the existence of a stable relationship between unemployment and future inflation. Second, if the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) model is assumed to be true, regional data can be used to identify the structural relationship between unemployment and future inflation. The empirical analysis of the regional data is remarkably consistent with the stability of the parameters in the assumed model. In addition, assuming the NAIRU model is true, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a roughly 0.3 percentage point decline in inflation over the next year. Interestingly, this estimate is quite similar to estimates claimed by some NAIRU proponents several years ago.
1
Using a standard NAIRU-type model in which the central bank's objective is to stabilize inflation around a target rate, we first show that aggregate data are uninformative regarding the true structural relationship between unemployment and future inflation. We show that under a specific and reasonable definition of inflation targeting, the evolution of equilibrium inflation is a random walk.
2 Thus, no forecasting rule that uses a measure of unemployment, or any other variables for that matter, outperforms the naive rule that inflation next year will be the same as inflation last year. 3 The reasoning behind this result is straightforward. Given the assumptions regarding central bank behavior, policymakers will do whatever they can to keep the equilibrium inflation rate from departing from its specified target. Therefore, the 1 See, for instance, Reifschneider, Tetlow, and Williams (1999) who use a value of 0.4. 2 This result is the same as the one in Nicolini (2013) , but in a very different context. 3 This is the rule used by Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) in their influential paper.
1 difference between inflation and the target will be the result of unforecastable-from the central bank's viewpoint-shocks. Equilibrium inflation will be equal to the exogenous target plus shocks that are uncorrelated with variables in the information set of the central bank.
More generally, we show that if the central bank has a dual mandate on inflation and employment, the statistical relationship between unemployment and future inflation growth depends on policy parameters such as the relative weights and values for the targets. We show that under changing policy regimes, our theory implies that the relationship between unemployment and inflation also changes. Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) and many others have provided a dramatic empirical demonstration of this point using data for the United States over the past 50 years.
Second, we show that if the NAIRU model is assumed to be true, the structural relationship can be identified by using regional data in a way that the theory makes very precise. The reason is that monetary policy stabilizes average inflation, so regional variation (which averages out nationally) can still be used to recover the structural parameter. We show that it is the difference between regional and average variables that should maintain a stable relationship in spite of changes in the policy regime.
We present some simple regressions-suggested by our theory-that show that the NAIRU model clearly passes this stability test. Moreover, the number we obtain for the partial effect on future inflation generated by a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment is 0.3 percentage points, very close to the 0.4 figure claimed by NAIRU Old Keynesians.
A caveat is in order. Our analysis assumes that the NAIRU model is true and derives a simple empirical test that is not affected by policy shifts. The model passes the test in a remarkable way. Although this finding is consistent with the NAIRU model, it may also be consistent with other interpretations, as we discuss in more detail in the conclusions. So our results do not prove Phillips curve skeptics wrong.
We simply argue that aggregate data are uninformative because policy is endogenous, and we show that regional data-which is immune to policy changes-show a robust and surprisingly stable relationship during the 1977-2010 period. This paper shows that aggregate data regressions should not be used to build skepticism or support for NAIRU models; in addition, regional data on their own do not provide clear evidence of parameter shifts.
Background on the Phillips Curve
The prominent role of central banks is to pursue price stability. On this account, Samuelson and Solow (1960) , who argued that a looser monetary policy that allows rising inflation could reduce the unemployment rate for several quarters.
However, the notion that the statistical relationship implied a trade-off between inflation and employment that could be exploited by monetary policy was forcefully contested by the pathbreaking work of Lucas (1972) , who provided a theoretical model without an exploitable trade-off but which was consistent with the existence of the observed statistical relationship. In Lucas, this statistical relationship depends on the parameters governing monetary policy, and in that sense it is not "structural."
The Lucas model predicted that if monetary policy attempted to exploit the observed relationship, the Phillips curve would shift (i.e., the parameters would change), resulting in higher inflation without any effect on unemployment. The dramatic shift in the Phillips curve and the stagflation of the late seventies that followed Lucas's work gave strength to the notion that there is no exploitable trade-off between inflation and measures of real activity.
Although the Phillips curve lost favor in most academic circles, it never abandoned the corridors of many central banks, though it remained with some important caveats.
The new version of the trade-off included the notion (known as the NAIRU hypothesis) that the real effects of a monetary policy are a short-run phenomenon. Models that include a NAIRU-type Phillips curve insist on the notion that monetary policy has predictable and structural effects on real activity.
The hypothesis of an exploitable Phillips curve, however, continues to be controversial. The influential paper by Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) and future inflation growth: the parameter is still consistently estimated to be around −03. The results of the regressions are also consistent with the assumption of policy shifts over time, as has been argued before (Atkeson and Ohanian (2001), Sargent (1999) ). A final section provides some caveats and concluding comments.
The Model with a Single Mandate
Consider a single-good labor-only economy with a continuum of separated identical markets and price frictions in each market. All markets use the same unit of account and face the same monetary policy. Moving across locations is costly, and the shocks are small enough so that there is no migration in equilibrium. These assumptions imply that we can treat each region as a closed economy that shares a common monetary policy with all other regions.
4
A very important caveat is in order. Modern macroeconomics is built on microfoundations. Old Keynesian (OK) models, such as the one we will describe, are not.
5
The purpose of this paper is to discuss evidence on whether the NAIRU Phillips curve has shifted over time in the last half century or so. For this purpose, we fully embrace an OK NAIRU-type model without microfoundations and use it to derive simple empirical tests.
Simple OK NAIRU-type models are described by a Phillips curve and an investment saving (IS) curve. These two differential equations with the two endogenous variables (inflation and unemployment deviations) are then solved to obtain a solution for each 4 These assumptions make the algebra very simple, but are by no means innocuous. See the discussion in Section 4. 5 Cochrane (2011) Typically, the Phillips curve and the IS curve equations are called "structural equations," whereas the dynamic equations that describe the solution are called "reduced form" equations. In what follows, we will be interested in the parameters governing the reduced form equations for three reasons. First, from a policy point of view, it is the reduced form equation that determines how much inflation increases in the future if unemployment is reduced today because of, say, a monetary policy shock. Second, the reduced form equations are the ones that determine the moments in the data we discuss in this paper. Third, given the lack of microfoundations in OK models, we do not find the distinction between "structural" and "reduced form" particularly interesting. In Appendix B we describe the structural equations of a particular OK model-a very minor extension of the one presented in Taylor (1999) and discussed in Cochrane (2011)-that delivers the reduced form expressions that follow.
Let   ()   () represent regional inflation and unemployment. The NAIRU model solution in region  is given by The key assumption in NAIRU models is that the parameter  is negative. If prices were fully flexible,  and  0 are presumably zero, though the lack of microfoundations
does not allow precise statements in this regard. 6 In the OK model described in Appendix B, the coefficient in the reduced form inherits the 7 If we define aggregates as
we obtain the following relationship between the aggregate variables:
(1)
Our assumption of identical regions implies that we do not need to weight the regional values in order to obtain the aggregate, which considerably simplifies the algebra that follows. In particular, the parameter  is the same for every region, so the solution for aggregate inflation in (1) also implies that higher current unemployment is associated with lower future inflation in each region.
The stability over time of that parameter , particularly across different monetary policy regimes, has been the focus of much discussion in the literature. The ability to identify  in the data is the focus of this paper.
Exogenous Policy
Assume that the monetary authority follows an exogenous policy. For the sake of argument, let   =  for all  for some   0 Then, equilibrium inflation 7 evolves as
(negative) sign of the coefficient in the structural form. In NK models, the structural coefficient is positive, rather than negative. 7 We ignore some issues regarding price level determinacy in this subsection; see footnote 9 for more details. (2001) is inconsistent with a stable value for  in this model.
Endogenous Policy
To start with the simplest case, imagine the central bank has a single mandate to stabilize inflation. In particular, imagine that the bank solves the following policy
given   ,   , and the solution for aggregate inflation (1)  The target for inflation is given by  * +1 . The optimal policy rule is
¢¤  so the equilibrium value for inflation is given by
The behavior of equilibrium inflation depends on the behavior of the target for inflation,  * +1 , which is not observable. To gain further insight, we next consider several specifications for the inflation target. We then use these specifications in our empirical analysis. 8 For a similar analysis in a different application, see Nicolini (2013) . 9 An issue regarding uniqueness is related to this policy rule. We show in Appendix B that in the context of that particular OK model, this is not a problem. See also Cochrane (2011) for a discussion of determinacy in models of this type.
Constant inflation target
so current unemployment would be related to the change in inflation to the extent that the forecast error (
But if an estimate of the change in inflation different from zero is obtained, it is unrelated to the direct effect of unemployment on future inflation, or 
Inflation target with bands
Next assume that the target for inflation is given by
Thus, as long as the target remains within the band,  *
so inflation would be a random walk. In this case, current unemployment-or, for that matter, any variable in the information set at time -should not help predict inflation. Thus, according to this theory, the analysis in Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) is uninformative regarding the structural parameter  10 10 This case is inconsistent with regressions using aggregate data delivering nonzero coefficients for some periods of recent U.S. history. On the other hand, it is hard to argue that this regime is a reasonable characterization of U.S. monetary policy for some of those periods, such as the seventies.
We discuss this further below.
Regional Regressions
We now show how regional data can provide useful information on the parameter . The regional equations exploit the fact that the deviations of the regional variables with respect to the national average will not be correlated with policy, since policy responds, by assumption, only to the national average. Indeed, applying the optimal policy to the solution for each region, we obtain
If the inflation target is constant, then the following regression,
allows us to identify the effect of unemployment in future inflation, 
On the other hand, for the case of the inflation target with a band, and assuming inflation was always within the band, we obtain
A final, more general specification would simply add a time effect to the regression
where the time dummy can be interpreted as an estimate of the inflation target for each period.
Empirical findings
To explore the empirical implications of this regional approach, we analyze semiannual CPI inflation and unemployment data from 27 MSAs in the United States.
In our regressions we define   () to be the period  unemployment rate for MSA , and  +1 () to be the inflation rate over the following year (i.e.,   +2 ()   ()).
Appendix C describes the data set in detail.
The stochastic component in equations (4) to (6) can potentially be correlated with the variables on the right-hand side to the extent that the shock  +1 () can be autocorrelated. In that case, since   () will be correlated with   () and   () it may be important to use instrumental variables. Thus, we will report ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least-squares (2SLS) results in what follows, where lagged values of the unemployment rate are used in the first stage. Table 1 provides estimates for the coefficient  in regressions (4) to (6) for four different subperiods of our sample. For these regressions, we used headline CPI inflation. The first three lines provide the OLS results, and the last three provide the 2SLS results using lagged unemployment rates as the instrument. In Figure 1 , we plot the time dummies of regression (6) Not surprisingly, the pattern of the time dummies suggests that the assumption of constant inflation target (4) or a target with bands (5) does not fit well with the first subperiod. Table 2 shows the results using core CPI inflation. Data for core inflation at the 13 MSA level are available only for the last three periods. Here, the  coefficients in the final three periods fall within an even tighter range, with values between −022 and −045. In summary, the coefficient  is remarkably stable around −03.
The Dual Mandate Model
The literature has clearly documented that a nonnegative coefficient can be estimated in Phillips curve regressions, at least for some subperiods of recent U.S. history. 11 Those results contradict our simple theory, which predicts those coefficients to be zero.
As we show in the next subsection, a more general model of the central bank that allows for regime changes is fully consistent with those results while leaving unchanged the conclusions reached in the previous section on the stability of the  coefficient using regional regressions.
11 Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) and Fisher, Liu, and Zhou (2002) .
Consider the same underlying model but imagine now that the central bank acts according to a dual mandate. In particular, imagine it solves the following policy problem:
given the solutions (1) and (2)  where and { * +1   * +1 } are the time-varying targets for inflation and unemployment and  is the weight the central bank puts on its inflation target. We assume this weight to be time invariant, but as we will see, the data suggest that it has changed across subperiods.
The solution for the optimal policy is given by
Replacing the solution for inflation,
Thus, the marginal effect of unemployment on future inflation is given by the coeffi-
which depends on the policy parameter . In general, if  ∈ (0 1) the coefficient may take any value, depending on the values for   0   0
12 The details are in Appendix A.
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Note also that if there are shifts over time in the weight the central bank assigns to each target, the estimated coefficient would be time varying, as the empirical literature has found.
13
If  = 1 the coefficient becomes
as in the single mandate model.
The Regional Equations
We now analyze the equilibrium solution for each of the regions. The solution for the model is
and the policy rate is
This equation is different from (3) in two important respects. First the coefficient on regional unemployment is the one that provides information regarding the structural parameter  whereas the coefficient on average unemployment is no longer its negative. Thus, both regional and national unemployment should appear independently 13 A change in  could be interpreted as a regime shift, since it would affect the policy rule and the equilibrium of the model. A regime shift of this type is also consistent with the analysis in Sargent (1999).
on the right-hand side of the regression (the same applies to regional and national inflation). Second, the variable Π  is a nonlinear function of the two policy targets and the structural parameters of the model. To the extent that the targets are constant over time, so will be the term [ +  Π  ]  in which case adding a constant to the regression should suffice and a regression similar to (4) can be estimated. Similarly, a time dummy can certainly be interpreted as an estimate of [ +  Π  ]  since the term does not involve any region-specific information. Note, finally, that there is no counterpart to (5) in this case.
We now repeat the regressions (4) and (6) we did in Section 2, but this time we allow for both   () and   to enter independently on the right-hand side, rather than using the difference between the two. The results are reported in Tables 3 and 4 for headline and core inflation, respectively. 1977-2010 1977-1984 1985-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 1984-2010 1977-1984 1985-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010  The first notable result is that the coefficients on the regional unemployment rate in these dual mandate regressions again remain remarkably near −03 for each of the subperiods. Even under the assumption of a constant target, the coefficient on
is estimated to be close to −03 for the first subsample; it is −025 versus −003 in Table 1 . The estimated value for the 2SLS version becomes too negative, but the standard error is large.
Another interesting feature of the results is that one has the beginning of a theory that explains why the unemployment coefficient in regressions that use aggregate data changes over time in response to changes in policy regimes. For example, the assumption of pure inflation target  = 1 is consistent with the results for the 1990s. This is the case in which the coefficient on national unemployment is equal to minus the coefficient on regional unemployment. In the case of CPI headline, this is clearly off the mark for the first two subsamples but remarkably close for the third. A similar, though less drastic, pattern holds for core inflation. The pattern changes for the last subperiod.
14 This is consistent with the hypothesis that  is lower than 1 at the 14 One might think that monetary policy after the 2008 crisis implied a regime change, and that 18 beginning and becomes close to 1 by the 1990s. In turn, this finding is consistent with the analysis in Sargent (1999) that argues that by the 1990s, the central bank was essentially targeting inflation-much unlike its behavior in the 1970s.
Conclusions
The literature on the stability of NAIRU-type Phillips curves has ignored the impact of endogenous monetary policy on Phillips curve regression coefficients. We argue that this omission has important implications: when policy is endogenous, regressions on aggregate data are uninformative as to the existence of a stable relationship between unemployment and future inflation. We provide a simple framework that incorporates endogenous policy. We show that if the NAIRU model is assumed to be true, regional data can be used to identify the structural relationship between unemployment and inflation. Using data from 1976 to 2010 and from 27 MSAs, our analysis cannot reject the hypothesis that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a roughly 0.3 percentage point decline in inflation over the next year.
This holds over the entire time period and, more remarkably, over each of the four subperiods for the model with a time-varying inflation target.
We caution that these results should not be interpreted as providing conclusive evidence of a stable Phillips curve, because the findings may well be consistent with other interpretations. One could consider alternative theoretical frameworks in line with the literature that studies movements in real exchange rates in open economies.
Indeed, if there are goods that are not traded across cities, differences in regional inflation rates reflect, at least partially, movements in relative prices that are different across cities. Imagine a demand shock for some of those nontraded goods in a particular city. The resulting increase in production would reduce unemployment and would explains why the results for this subperiod differ from the  = 1 case. However, when we repeated the regressions up until 2007, the results also differ.
increase the relative price of the nontraded good, creating a negative relationship between unemployment and inflation. 15 With relatively rich dynamics, that alternative theoretical framework will most likely be consistent with our regional regressions as well.
Appendix A A Solution for the Optimal Policy
The problem is
given (1) and (2)  Replacing the constraints, we obtain
The solution is
Taking expectations, we obtain
since the targets are known at time  This can be written as
The solution is given by
Replacing the solution for inflation, we have
A.1 The effect on the regional equations
The solution for the model is
Some algebra gives us
In what follows, we interpret the unemployment rate as deviations from its steady state level  or, equivalently, we set  = 0
Using the second in the first, we have 
B.1 The interest rate rule
If we assume, as Taylor (1999) and Cochrane (2011) do, that
we show below, this equation-with a reinterpretation of the parameters-will arise exactly as the solution in any case, as long as  is zero. Given the lack of microfoundations, this reinterpretation seems innocuous to us. 
